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Abstract: The paper describes a weighted-voting system for the
election of a Parliament. The system is easy to implement, and it
dominates plurality, where “dominates” means that it performs better
with reference to both representativeness  and stability. The system
has some other nice properties, namely (a) it offers an easy-to-read
evaluation of the loss of representativeness  of an electoral system;
and (b) it makes it relatively easy to adopt the best system after the
vote, i.e. the best system conditional to the choice of electors.
Indicators for representativeness  and stability are defined. Results are
experimental.
JEL Classification number: D722
1. Introduction.
This paper describes a system for choosing a (one-Chamber) Parliament
with some nice properties, namely:
a) It dominates
1 simple plurality system, possibly sophisticated ones too;
b) It offers an easy-to-read evaluation of the loss of representativeness of
an electoral system, i.e. of the cost of choosing a system with a higher stability;
c) It makes it quite easy to adopt the best system after the vote, i.e. the
best system conditional to the choice of electors.
 A possible fourth propriety will be discussed in sect. 5.
  Representativeness, R, may be roughly defined “the capacity to
correctly represent the choices of the electors”; and stability, G, “the capacity to
effectively govern the State”, i.e. with low transaction and information costs.
Most scholars accept that proportional systems allow for a high
representativeness but at the price of a low stability, while the opposite holds
for plurality systems (to my knowledge, only Breton and Galeotti, 1985, do not
agree). The point is discussed in more detail in a previous paper (Ortona, 1998).
   If we have indicators of representativeness and of stability, r and g
respectively, we may place the electoral systems on a two-dimension graph
2,
where every system will appear as a point. Next, we may safely admit that first-
order partial derivatives of all plausible functions of social preference for
electoral system f(r,g) are both positive. This is sufficient to obtain two results:
                                               
1 This term will be defined below.
2 What follows, duly generalized, holds for more dimensions too. In this paper we will
deal only with R and G; possible further dimensions will be briefly discussed in sect. 8.3
a) A system A located Northeast of all the others is the best one; I label
A dominant.
b) A system B located Southwest of another system C may be excluded;
I label B dominated, and I say that C dominates B.
  As noticed, the system discussed in this paper dominates at least
simple plurality systems, and probably sophisticated ones too; while it does not
dominate proportional ones. This is an  experimental result, obtained in all the
simulations I performed, under some assumptions to be discussed immediately.
It is maybe possible to find out cases, albeit peculiar, where it does not hold,
and it may be interesting to find out the validity conditions analytically. This is
left to further research. The assumptions are:
(a) the majority coalition is always the minimum winning coalition;
(b) there are no jumps on the left-right axis;
(c) the relative majority party always forms the government.
   Assumptions (a) and (b) are usual in this kind of experiments, and
harmless in our setting. This is not the case, however, for assumption(c). Let’s
accept it for the time being; I will discuss what happens if it does not hold in
sect. 8.
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces  indexes r and
g.  Section 3 describes the new system. Section 4 and 5 present the
experiments, results a) (see above) and an ancillary result. Sections 6 and 7
illustrate results b) and c). Further considerations are in sections 8 and 9.4
2. The indexes.
The indexes adopted here are different from those adopted in Ortona,
1998.  Index r is:
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where j refers to the electoral system, N is the number of parties, Sj,i is
the number of seats obtained by party i under system j, Spp,i is the number of
seats obtained by party i under perfect proportionality rule, and Su,i is the
number of seats obtained by party i if all the seats go to the largest party
3.
The index may be read as follows. The first sum is the loss of
representativeness of system j, measured as the sum of the differences between
seats obtained by all parties under j and those obtained under perfect
proportionality. The second sum defines a maximum for the loss of
representativeness, that of the unanimity system. The ratio normalizes the loss
or representativeness to the range 0-1: in the case of unanimity system the value
of the ratio is 1, while in the case of perfect proportionality is 0. The subtraction
from 1 transforms the index of “non-representativeness” in an index of
representativeness.
                                               
3 The value of Su,i is the total number of seats for relative majority party, and 0 for the
other ones.5
The index is quite similar to the first, c
2 like, index suggested by
Mudambi (1996); The main difference is that it is normalized. Note that the
“real” values of the extremes are contingent upon the real constituency;
differently from the second index of Mudambi, this one does not allow
comparisons among constituencies
4.
An example may be useful.
Example 1. Suppose the following constituency, where three systems are under
scrutiny.
Parties Number of seats under
Perfect proportionality Plurality Intermediate
A 40 60 60
B 30 40 20
C 10 0 10
D 10 0 10
E 10 0 0
The index takes the values 1-0/120 = 1, 1-60/120 = 0.5,  and 1-40/120 = 0.67
respectively.
  Now, the index g. Stability amounts by large to “efficiency” in
producing a government. I admit that it depends from (a) the number of parties
of the governing coalition that may destroy the majority if they withdraw, m;6
(b) the variance of the share of seats of the parties that form the governing
coalition, s
2
s  (a coalition of two parties with 26 seats each out of 100 is
sounder than a 49-3 coalition); and (c) the share of seats of the majority, F. I
adopt a Cobb-Douglas form, mostly to leave room for adding further factors, if
theory or empirical research suggest
5. Consequently, the index is




  Lacking information, I admit for the time being b=1 and c=d=0, so the
maximum value of g is again 1 (when there is only one party, presumably the
largest or the only one, that may cause the crashing of the governing coalition),
and the minimum tends to 0 as the number of “fatal” parties increase. The
relevance of the first factor is suggested by experiments (see Ortona, 1998) and
by the Italian evidence of shortlived governments. Government coalition used
to be formed by one (sometimes two) large party, and some small or very
small. Understandably, the last ones were the most turbulent, and most crises
were produced by their withdrawal. This aspect of stability was not duly
appreciated, for instance, by Vannucci (1997). With the values of the
parameters suggested above, the index is not that different from a simpler and
more traditional one - the number of parties in the government coalition.
However, plurality systems are likely to be dominated with different values of
parameters too, provided they are plausible (see sect.3). With references to
example 1, g takes the values 0.5, 1 and 1 respectively.
                                                                                              
4 This point is also discussed in Ortona (1998).
5 An instance will appear below.7
3. The VAP system.
The new system suggested here, that I labelled VAP
6, is a simple
weighted-voting system, and bears some resemblance with the majority
premium system. In a majority premium system, the party or the parties that
form the government get additional seats as a premium. This system has two
serious inconveniences. First, it calls to the Parliament someone who  has not
been elected, and who may well have obtained less votes than someone who
will stay out. Second, and more seriously if we adopt a Schumpeterian
approach, this feature does not offer a guarantee against the “blackmailing”
power of small parties, based on the (credible) menace of withdrawing
7. Both
inconveniences are resolved in the VAP system, that runs as follows.
a) MPs are elected through a proportional system; in what follows we
will assume perfect proportionality, for sake of simplicity.
b) Parties form a government coalition as usual, and the government
gets its confidence vote as usual.
c) Since the government is in charge, votes for the government count
more: they are multiplied by some factor, a. For instance (but it is an important
one), if we want to have one crucial party, i.e. that the government coalition
                                               
6 VAP is the acronym of varduma péi, “let’s see later” in Piedmontese; and also of
“Voting a posteriori”. The reason will become clear in sect. 7.
7 Following Schumpeter (1943), and Stigler (1979), “The main accomplishment of
political competition is not to please voters, but to eliminate unnecessary returns to the
incumbent” (Galeotti, 1994, p.363).8
can still keep a majority of, say, 1 if all members but  the party that has the
relative majority leave it, the value of a is provided by
(1)        Xa = (Xa + T - X)/2 + 1
Where X is the number of seats of the relative majority party, and T the
total of seats. If the desired majority is Y instead of 1, it is sufficient to
introduce Y instead of 1 as the last figure.
In other words, there will be two parliaments: a “real” one of, say, 100
seats with a governing coalition of, say, 26+25 seats; and a “virtual” one of
196, with 147 belonging to the majority. If the smaller party of the coalition
leaves the government, its 72 “virtual” seats reduce to the “real” 25, and the
majority still keeps 75 seats against 74. The value of a, 2.9, that produces these
figures is obtained from (1).
Obviously, r and g for the VAP system must be computed out on the
basis of virtual seats. The following example 2 shows how they are obtained for
the case of example 1.
Example 2. Given the figures of example 1, suppose that we want a
VAP system such that the relative majority party can govern alone with a
majority of 10. The value of a, given by 40a=(40a+60)/2+10, is 2. The
government coalition is made up of the first two parties. Hence we get:9
Party real seats virtual seats virtual seats under
perfect
proportionality
A 40 80 (40/100)170 = 68
B 30 60 (30/100)170 = 51
C 10 10 (10/100)170 = 17
D 10 10 (10/100)170 = 17
E 10 10 (10/100)170 = 17
Total 100 170 170
     
                                     
The value of S|Spp,i-Su,i| from the third column is 102+51+17+17+17 =
204, while the value of S|Sj,i-Spp,i| from the second and third columns is
12+9+7+7+7 = 42. The value of rvap is 1-42/204 = 0.794, and the value of gvap is
1. In section 2 we saw that the corresponding figures for plurality system are
0.5 and 1, so VAP dominates plurality.10
  Note that it is not necessary to force the crucial parties to be 1. If the
rule of the constituency allows for m crucial parties, a can be easily be obtained
by
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and so on.
 Before leaving the topic, we may see why the value of parameters of g
is probably irrelevant in what concerns the dominance of plurality systems. s is
almost assuredly higher under plurality rule than under VAP, so assuming c>0
increases the dominance of VAP. The same holds for F: in the previous
example, for instance, the value of F is 0.6 for plurality, and 140/170=0.82 for
VAP11
4. Simulations with fictitious data.
In this section I will present some
8 simulations with fictitious data.
Results in table 1 are typical.
Table 1. Possible Parliaments with 8 parties and 600 seats.
Parties Perf. Prop. Plurality, 1 Plurality, 2 Plurality, 3 VAP
(Virtual seats)
A 150 312 312 312 451
B 60 0 0 0 181
C 60 0 0 0 181
D 42 0 0 0 126
E 126 288 260 144 126
F 126 0 28 144 126
G 18 0 0 0 18
H 18 0 0 0 18
r 1 0.280 0.342 0.560 0.679
g 0.250 1 1 1 1
a 3.01
  The second column corresponds to a typical two-party constituency,
the third recalls by large the British case, and the fourth is not too different
from the results of perfect proportionality. The minimum winning coalition is
always made of one party
9; this feature is not essential, as we saw. The value of
                                               
8 Not  all. I ran a lot of simulations on fictitious data, and  always found that VAP
dominates plurality and majority; however, I cannot claim this result to be necessary.
9 Previous experiments (Ortona, 1998) indicated that a plurality system producing a two-
party majority is not particularly desirable.12
a is obtained from (1). As results, VAP dominates all plurality parliaments,
but not the proportional one.13
5. Simulations with real data.
Now we move to real data. The first set are the complete preferences
over the (then) 12 parties of the Italian parliament of a sample of 253 students
of the faculty of Law of the University of Torino, collected in 1995. A
Parliament of 100 seats is produced, through a process of randomisation to take
care of the central limit theorem
10. The same set and the same procedure were
employed in Ortona (1998). Results are in table 2.
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r 1 0.838 0.377 0.351 0.656 0.642
g 0.333 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
a 3 2.5
  Virtual seats are 196 in 5
th column and 181 in 6
th. The admittance
threshold in column 2 is 4%. As results, both VAP systems dominate plurality
and majority, but not proportional systems.
   The second set of data is more interesting: they are real data of the
election of the Italian Parliament in 1996. The electoral system was mixed:
75% of seats were allocated through plurality system, and the remaining
through proportional system. So electors voted with both systems, and we can
                                               
10 The method is fully described in Trinchero (1998) and summarized in Ortona (1998).14
see and use their first preferences over both. The parliament was supposed to
have 600 seats
11. Most parties grouped for running for the plurality share, while
they did not for the proportional one, so we may consider as subjects either the
parties or the groups of parties. I considered both in turn.  Results for single
parties are in table 3.
Table 3. Possible Italian Parliaments in 1996.
Perf. Prop. Real Plurality VAP1 VAP2
Number of parties 12 10 10 12 12
Number of parties
in the majority
4 6 4 4 4
Seats of the
majority
316 301 308 316 316
r 1 0.869 0.763 0.620 0.739
g 0.250 0.167 0.250 1 0.5
a 3.740 2.363
  The Parliament of the first and third columns are obtained from the
share of votes allocated through the proportional and plurality systems
respectively; while that of the second corresponds to the real one. VAP1 allows
for 1 crucial party, and VAP2 for two (see the previous section). Note that non-
proportional systems are dominated by perfect proportionality. However, the
value of g  in the first column is very low, so it may be advisable to resort to a
VAP system in this case too. VAP system does not dominate plurality, but this
is due only to the number of crucial parties, 1 or 2 in VAP systems and 4 in
plurality. A four crucial party VAP system would dominate plurality, but g
                                               
11 This number was chosen because of its divisibility, and because it is very similar to
the real number of seats (630) of Italian Lower Chamber.15
would decline back to 0.250, so it would be dominated by perfect
proportionality.
   If you excuse the oxymoron, this real case is unrealistic: if the only
system is plurality or majority, Duverger’s law forces the parties to unite to
produce less, and larger, parties. During this process, all the parties lose
representativeness
12. It is impossible for me to quantify this loss
13, so I admit
that the loss (or gain: see fn. 12) is nil, and that the groups of party that joined
for plurality-allocated seats are comparable to single parties. Results are in
table 4.
Table 4. Further Italian Parliaments in 1996.
Perf. Prop. Real Plurality VAP
Number of parties 5 5 5 5
Number of parties
of the majority
2 2 1 2
Seats of the
majority
333 308 315 333
r 1 0.802 0.671 0.916
g 0.500 0.500 1 1
a 1.205
  The first and third columns are obtained assigning the votes of the
proportional and of the plurality shares respectively to the groups of parties,
while the second is obtained from the grouping of seats allocated for real. As
results, VAP dominates by large real and plurality.
                                               
12 This is the  common wisdom hypothesis, and I share it. Breton and Galeotti (1985) do
not.
13 This feature could be incorporated in r adding a factor, for instance (1/T)
m, where T is
the ratio between number of parties under perfect proportionality and that under
plurality or majority. In absence of information, we may  suppose m=0.16
Interesting enough, the value of r for VAP1 in table 3 is quite close to
that of plurality in table 4. This suggests that it may be not necessary to force
the grouping of parties to obtain a higher stability. Remember that the
reduction of the number of parties entails a loss or representativeness, and the
role of the omitted factors in g. This is a precious hint, worthy further inquiry.
I did not compute out the indexes for more sophisticated non-
proportional systems. However, experiments in Ortona (1998) provided  figures
very close to those of  simpler methods for five such systems, i.e. Condorcet,
Borda, Hare, Coombs and Approval.
So we discussed the main result of section 1. Let’s move to the other
two.17
6. The meaning of a.
If the value of a is, say, 2, it means that  the vote of MPs voting for the
government counts twice that of the opposition. There is a violation of  the
principle “one person-one vote”. The violation, however, is less serious than
that of the plurality system with the same number of crucial parties, as results
from the value of r. This allows us to state that the violation of the principle
implied in the choice of plurality system is at least as sound as that of the VAP
system. It follows that we may read a as the (minimum) cost of the violation
implied in the choice of plurality system
14. To obtain a government with only
(say) one crucial party, citizens must accept that the value of votes for the
majority is (say) twice that of the opposition. Obviously, there are many ways
of computing this cost. The use of a has the only, yet relevant, merit of
simplicity and readability. This is sufficient for result b) of section 1.
                                               
14 This holds for all the systems dominated by VAP.18
7. Choosing the voting system after the election.
In principle, it is quite simple to choose the electoral system after the
election. All what you need is a set of relevant dimensions, a set of continuous
indicator for the dimensions, and a suitable Social Preference Function.
Suppose, not necessarily for simplicity, that the dimensions are two. You may
plot electoral system in a graph, trace down a set of indifference curves from
the SPF, and find out the best system. Note that to collect information suitable
for different electoral system is not difficult, as is shown inter alia by the cases
of Australia and Italy.
  The real difficulties are two. First, as Duverger’s law orders, the
essence of the institution “party” may be different under different electoral
systems. Second, as for other sectors of social sciences, it is probably
impossible to write down for real a plausible SPF.
   If the result of the end of section 4 is general
15, the first difficulty is
overcome: parties represent preference better under perfect proportionality,
when there are many, and there is no need to reduce their number to increase
governability.
   The second difficulty may be resolved on practical grounds. For
instance, the electoral constitution may establish that it is worthy to “pay” a
value of a equal to 2.5 to obtain one crucial party, of 2 to obtain two, of 1.5 to
obtain three and so on. If these thresholds are not reached, it means that
correcting the (perfect or not) proportionality is too costly.
                                               
15 And if Breton and Galeotti (1985) are wrong.19
8. Minority parties coalitions.
As stated in sect.1, we admitted that the largest party is always in the
government. This may and may not be true. If it is not, the VAP system may be
inferior to plurality.
Consider again example 1, but suppose that the government is made up
of parties BCDE instead of AB. Following the logic of VAP method, a must be
obtained from (1) allowing the largest party of the coalition (B) to keep the
majority if left alone. The value is 2.4, and it is simple to compute out that the
values of r and g for VAP system are 0.690 and 1, so plurality is still
dominated.
But suppose instead (a) that there are only three parties, with 26, 25 and
49 seats respectively under proportionality, and 24, 25 and 51 under plurality;
and (b) that the first two form the government. In this case, the value of r will
be 1 for both systems, but that of g will be 0.959 for plurality and only 0.524
for VAP.
The second set of figures is quite peculiar
16, yet it cannot be excluded.
What to do in this case? The most obvious solution, to give the relative
majority party the weight required to govern alone, goes against the spirit of
VAP, as it unchains Duverger’s law. A better solution is to fix a number of
crucial parties lower than 1. Under this rule, not even the largest party of the
governing coalition may cause its collapsing alone.
                                               
16 The  value of  r under plurality is very high because the distribution of seats is very
similar to that of proportionality. If, under plurality, seats are for instance 20, 20 and 60,
r reduces to 0.475, and VAP dominates plurality again.20
To pursue further the discussion would bring us into the (many) details
of VAP system, and I prefer to leave the topic to further inquiries. Note that the
possible unavailability of VAP may again be assessed a posteriori.21
9. Further dimensions.
The whole discussion is based on the assumption that only
representativeness and stability are relevant for the choice of an electoral
system. This assumption is neither peculiar nor original; Cox (1997), just to
quote one, admits it. These two dimensions are clearly important, and at least in
Italy they are crucial for the present political debate
17; but there is no reason to
rule out that other dimensions may be  important too. Levin and Nalebuff
(1995), for instance, suggest five more, Sen (1995) two, Mudambi et al. (1996)
two, Myerson (1995) one and Myerson (1993) still another one. No need to
explicitly quote them (but one: see below). The obvious conclusion of this short
listing is that it could be advisable to check the performance of VAP system
with reference to a larger set of requirements.
Myerson (1995, p.83) claims that “electoral system should be evaluated
by the incentives that they create not for the voters, but for the politicians when
they form parties, choose policy positions, and offers themselves as candidates
for high office”. It is straightforward to add to this list “and when they form a
government”. From this point of view, VAP system is no more “midway”
between proportional and plurality; instead, it is on one side while both other
systems are on the other.
Both plurality and proportional systems tend to produce a centrist
government. This is obvious and largely known for plurality, since Hotelling
(1929). As for proportional system, centrist parties, even if small, can drive the
                                               
17  But they are not the only ones. Someone  prefers not to have parties at all, and
consequently prefers majority systems as they, supposedly,  reduce their relevance.
Someone else rejects the principle “one person, one vote” on the ground of economic
efficiency, and consequently prefers restricted voting systems. Both positions appear in
press.22
strategy of the government towards their preferences through the (credible)
menace of a change of majority. Both results are largely confirmed by
evidence. In VAP system, centrist parties lose a lot (not all) of their
blackmailing power. Most of it is in the hands of crucial party (or parties); it
does not need to move towards the center
18.
Is this a desirable feature? Maybe, and maybe not. On one side,  a
median government minimizes the sum of the distances of the preferences of
the electors from those of government (Cox, 1997). On the other, the constraint
of a median government reduce the choice set of the electors, and creates a sort
of monopoly rent for the parties (Myerson,1995
19).
I will not go deeper into this question; yet, it is relevant, and worth
further inquiry.
                                               
18  Note that the necessity to form a coalition reduces the ”blackmailing” power of the
largest party, and this may be a desirable feature.
19 According to Myerson (1993), for instance, plurality systems are more proclive to
corruption then proportional ones.23
10. Conclusions.
VAP system seems to work well, and it is very simple to implement.
Further inquiry is consequently advisable. I suggest five direction:
a) To compare it with sophisticated plurality voting.
b) To test its validity for plausible ranges of the parameters of the
indicators.
c) To test its validity under different indicators.
d) To evaluate it  with reference to other dimensions.
e) To analyse its effects on government formation and, more broadly, on
the behavior of MPs and candidates.24
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